

**AMSS 35<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference**  
**“Muslim Identities: Shifting Boundaries and Dialogues”**

**Cosponsored by**  
**Hartford Seminary, Hartford, CT**  
**October 27 – 29, 2006**

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**“Different Actors, Intersecting Interests and the “Islamic Revival:  
A Sociological Inquiry of the Islamic Movement in the post-1980 Turkey”**

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The article analyses the emergence of the “Islamic revival” from a sociological perspective. Basically, it examines the Islamic movement with the four main components; the Islamic intelligentsia, the Kurds, peripheral entrepreneurs and the urban poor and explores the particular rationale of each group. However, consistent with the deficiencies in the literature, the article focuses mainly on the urban poor and emphasises the role of the populist discourse of the Islamic movement, transformation of the solidarity networks of the poor into ethnic and religious cleavages, and the organizational abilities of the Islamic movement, especially the spectacular utilization of the women activists.

One of the most controversial issues in contemporary Turkey is the rising visibility of Islam both in the public and political spheres. The victory of the religiously oriented parties in the national and local elections of the 1990s and the electoral success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 3 October 2002 can be taken as powerful indicators of this Islamic rise. However, events in the political sphere are only the visible part of the iceberg. Besides, Turkey has experienced a sudden increase in the numbers of institutions such as charity organizations, NGOs, business corporations and TV channels that employ a predominantly Islamic language. Therefore, it is valid to claim that alongside the political achievements, the Islamic movement<sup>1</sup> was able to penetrate into the public sphere. On the basis of this observation, the main objective of this study is to explain this claimed “Islamic revival” from a more sociological perspective.

In fact several studies have tried to explain the Islamic rise by following different perspectives. For instance, there is the literature that emphasizes the economic basis of the Islamic movement by underlining the economic motivation of Islamic entrepreneurs for extending their economic power in reference to large-scale industrialist and importers<sup>2</sup>. In addition, there is a growing literature, which considers the Islamic rise within the failure of modernization or in the collapsing state hegemony<sup>3</sup>. Finally, there is the literature of party politics, which directs our attention to the clientele relations and political manoeuvres of the Islamic movement<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, all of these perspectives are valid contributions to explain the phenomenon. However, we do claim that in order to solve the riddle of Islamic rise, a new standpoint that combines these perspectives is necessary. Therefore, the current study proposes a multi-layered perspective, which employs these distinctive literatures to explain the particular rationales of various segments contributing to the claimed “Islamic revival”. To do this, the article examines the phenomenon vis-à-vis different socio-economic groups and aims to explore the particular rationales of the four main groups, namely, the Islamic intelligentsia, the Kurds, peripheral entrepreneurs and the urban poor. Within these groups the urban poor remains the most frequently mentioned, but least explored. Therefore, though the article deals also with the first three, the main focus of the article remains on the particular rationale of the urban poor, which enabled the noteworthy electoral successes of the Islamic movement by its significant vote potential. In order to demonstrate the peculiar rationale of this group for supporting the Islamic movement, the article employs the model proposed by Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç<sup>5</sup>, which was originally developed to understand the survival strategies of the urban poor, and adopts it to explain the rise of the Islamic movement in post-1990 period.

The article claims that due to the economic recession brought by the introduction of neo-liberal policies, the solidarity networks of the urban poor evolved into ethnic and religious cleavages, which have been successfully utilized by the Islamic movement. In other words, in the 1990s a

predicted transformation of the solidarity networks of the poor into ethnic and religious cleavages occurred. We argue that the trigger of this transformation is not the political actors but the socio-economic context of the 1990s. However, what is crucial to grasp is the Islamic movement's ability to read this transformation properly and develop the required mechanisms to benefit from this structural transformation of the networks. At that level the article focuses on the organizational model of the Islamic movement, namely the "Model of Rosary", and the spectacular utilization of women's networks, which enabled the penetration of Islamic movement into the networks of the urban poor. To put it differently, the article perceives the women activists of the Islamic movement as the keystone in implementing the significant interaction between the Islamic movement and the urban poor.

Although it is possible to claim that Islamic movement in Turkey has very deep roots<sup>6</sup>, the current article focuses on the events in the last three decades and conceptualises the contemporary Islamic movement as a new political phenomenon. In fact, the improvement in the last decades especially supports such an approach. For instance, only in the post-1990 period, the metropolises of Turkey, as well as the provinces, faced women veiled in a peculiar way, which is by no means traditional<sup>7</sup>. In addition, several television channels and newspapers, which adopt a more conservative and Islamic worldview, emerged<sup>8</sup>. Parallel to this, the numbers of Islamic financial institutions and banks increased, as well as the Islamic entrepreneurs mushrooming in inner Anatolia, and these corporations gathered and established the religiously oriented MUSIAD, which became the second largest business association in Turkey<sup>9</sup>.

Two main features distinguish the contemporary Islamic movement from other political movements. The first feature is the party-movement amalgamation. In the Turkish context the difference between political movement and political party becomes blurred and Islamic parties function as a popular movement, operating as a political party<sup>10</sup>. Indeed, the continuous

prohibition and recoveries of the Islamic parties under a new party name indicates this feature of the movement. The following statement of an activist of the Islamic movement is illustrative: “If they close the party, then a few politicians lose their job; that’s all. It has no effects on us. We’re a social movement, not a party”<sup>11</sup>. The second feature is the trans-class basis of the Islamic movement. The Islamic movement emerged from the participation of different social groups with their particular rationales. In other words, the “Islamic revival” is a result of the interaction between different actors. Indeed, the nouvelle side of the Islamic movement of the 1990s lies in its ability to develop a powerful organizational model that was able to combine these various actors under the same goal; the pursuit of political power and the succeeding Islamic parties<sup>12</sup> constitute the centre that leads the Islamic movement.

As a result of this complex character of the Islamic movement, partial attempts that focus on a particular group within the movement or a single dimension of it fail to grasp the Islamic movement as a whole. Therefore, the Islamic movement should be analysed from a holistic perspective that considers various segments within the movement and effects of the surrounding context, simultaneously. Only through such a perspective a concrete picture of the Islamic revival can be constructed. In order to provide a holistic picture, the current study surveys the existing literature on the Islamic movement and emphasizes three main axes of deficiency. These are totalisation, de-contextualisation and de-concretisation.

Although in analysing the contemporary social movements, various dimensions are discussed and the phenomenon is examined comprehensively, there is a general tendency of totalisation, when the subject turns out to be the mysterious *phenomena islamica*<sup>13</sup>. This tendency becomes observable in the conventional literature about the Islamic movement, which conceptualises the emergence of the Islamic movement as the natural reaction towards the oppressive-secularists policies or as the “return” of the long oppressed (Islamic) subject, under favourable political conditions<sup>14</sup>.

Basically, within this literature the Islamic movement is dealt as if it constitutes an abiding and stable monolithic body and consequently, various segments within the movement and their distinctive rationales for engaging in the Islamic rise became unnoticed. Moreover, there is also another tendency that leads scholars to the totalisation of the Islamic movement. That is, scholars generally focus on an easily recognizable group within the Islamic movement and generalize the discussion about this group to the whole Islamic movement. For instance, Shambayati<sup>15</sup> focuses on peripheral entrepreneurs of inner Anatolia and claims that they are guarding their economic interest against the state policies via an Islamic language. However, he generalizes this rationale to the whole movement and claims that the Islamic movement in Turkey is economically motivated. On the other hand, those studies that point out various segments such as women and the Kurds, etc within the Islamic movement are unsatisfactory since they do not distinguish different segments clearly. For instance, Salt<sup>16</sup> mentions several groups supporting the Islamic rise in Turkey such as economically disadvantaged groups and Islamic entrepreneurs. However, he does not provide precise reasons for explaining their rationales for supporting the Islamic movement and consequently the picture presented by him remains imprecise.

Besides the tendency of totalisation, there is a general tendency to discuss the Islamic movement as if it is not demonstrating contextual differences and divergences. However, we do accept that “[t]here are as many Islams as there are situations sustaining it”<sup>17</sup>. Therefore, the effects of various settings that lead to distinctive Islamic movements should be included in analyses. Such a perspective that pays attention to the context could enable us to explain, for instance, why the Islamic movement has relative success in inner Anatolia and not in the coastal towns, or why it succeeded in the squatter settlements of the metropolises and not in the wealthy suburbs. We claim that the Islamic movement has different characteristics in reference to distinctive contexts, such as political settings or regional differences, and not taking them into account leads to the deficiencies in the analysis. For instance, in analysing the support of the Kurds to the Islamic

movement, the strong Islamic sentiment within the Kurdish population is emphasized over the political context in the south-eastern Turkey. As a result we are faced with a perception of Kurdishness that is totalised within Islam and consequently a perception of the Kurdish subject, which is determined solely by the virtues of his/her religion.

However, it would be unjust to accuse a number of scholars for de-contextualising the Islamic movement. There are studies that aim to contextualise, many of which sustain the significance of urban conditions, as we do<sup>18</sup>. However, contextualisation efforts are not supplied with the empirical materials that can illustrate the relations, occurring within these settings. Rather, the relations are explained through the application of common sense and “foggy” illustrations between the actors. In order to clear these de-concrete narrations, it is required to develop and use concrete models. This deficiency becomes critical when the discussions on the urban poor are considered. Commonly, within the literature the support of the urban poor is explained by referencing the debate on party politics and deep-rooted clientele relations in Turkish politics. However, this explanation lacks a concrete model that can illustrate the means of the clientele relations that are set in the urban periphery. As a result, this contextualisation is lack of a precise answer to the question: why was not any other political movement but the Islamic movement able to successfully acquire the support of the urban poor, since the clientele relations are seen almost in every political movement in Turkey?

In order not to repeat these deficiencies, we study the “Islamic revival” by fragmenting it into segments, i.e. we deal separately with the layers composing the ‘Islamic whole’. Although in the literature several actors are mentioned, contributing to the Islamic movement<sup>19</sup>, this study identifies four main groups: 1) Islamic intelligentsia composed of different elements from the university students to the Islamic artists, 2) Kurdish population mainly settled in the southeastern Turkey, 3) Peripheral-entrepreneurs of Anatolia trying to take a share from the globalising

economy in rivalry of the large-scale industrialists of Istanbul and 4) the urban poor that try to increase its 'life chances' under harsh economic conditions. In brief, in the Turkish political arena we are faced with the ideologically motivated stratum of Islamic intelligentsia; economically motivated peripheral entrepreneurs and the supporting masses; the Kurds that are articulated to the Islamic movement as a result of the political conditions in the south-eastern Turkey, and finally, the urban poor, who are bound to the Islamic movement through a web of clientele relations.

The first group, i.e., the Islamic intelligentsia is mainly composed of university students and graduates who are dissatisfied with the modernist and progressive ideologies such as Marxism, other left-wing paradigms, nationalism, and Kemalism<sup>20</sup>. Generally, this group has a "westernised" outlook and is well educated in the secular institutions. Most commonly, they come from middle and upper-middle class origins<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, they constitute a contrasting example in reference to the popular images of religious fundamentalists, who are thought to be "illiterate" and "pre-modern". Due to this contradictory position, scholars working on the issue continuously employ views of this group to analyse the Islamic movement. As a result, this group is over-represented within the discussions, which led to the habitual application of the identity politics paradigm for explaining the "Islamic revival". We claim that identity politics explains only the particular rationale of the Islamic intelligentsia. However, generalizing this discussion to explain the whole Islamic movement, would lead to the deficiency of totalization as we discussed above.

Keyder<sup>22</sup> explains the emergence of identity politics in reference to the modernization process and subsequent state policies. He labels Turkish modernization as "modernization from above". According to him, this feature enabled modernizers to initiate a modernization project corresponding to their own interest, which deepened the already existing gap between the elite

and masses. This increasing gap resulted in the alienation of masses from the modernization project and led them to perceive modernization as the instrument of the authoritarian state. Due to this disability of Turkish modernization to penetrate into the whole society, different identity groups based on ethnicity and religion could not be eliminated as predicted by the Turkish modernizing elite. Accordingly, the roots of the Islamic movement should be examined within these groups. From a more political perspective, Keyman<sup>23</sup> emphasizes the state policies as the key factor for explaining identity politics. According to him, due to the legitimacy crises of the Turkish state, different identity groups emerged and challenged the hegemonic discourse of the national identity. Moreover, in reference to Islam, he underlines the state policies of the post-1980 period, which promoted Islamic discourse as an alternative to Kemalism, for renovating the lost unifying power of the state hegemony.

The second group is the Kurds, mainly settled in the south-eastern Turkey. An investigation of the vote statistics of the Islamic parties in Turkey will reveal that, in south-eastern Turkey, where the majority of the population is composed of the ethnic Kurds, the vote proportion of Islamic parties are significantly higher than any other political party, except pro-Kurdish ones. This fact illustrates the importance of the “Kurdish factor” in the success of the Islamic movement<sup>24</sup>. As a result, there is a growing literature that tries to understand the tendency of the Kurds towards the Islamic movement.

First of all, it is commonly accepted fact that Islam has always been a defining and unifying factor among the Kurds. This view is repeatedly defended by the Kurdish Islamist writers<sup>25</sup>. However, this view must be elaborated carefully since it contains the risk of totalising Kurdishness within Islam<sup>26</sup>. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis of the critical interaction between the Kurds and Islam would reveal that the roots of the Islamic movement among the Kurds must be explained in reference to the centralization policies of the Ottoman state in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The policy of the

Ottoman state in Kurdish region was to discharge the Kurdish emirates, which had been semi-independent political bodies throughout the Ottoman history, to consolidate the political power in the centre. This policy led to the increasing importance of the Kurdish tribes, micro social and political units that were once united under several emirates. However, the insufficiency of the centre to further its centralization policy resulted in the creation of continuous conflicts among the Kurdish tribes due to the lack of a unifying and regulating body and later on, the local religious leaders, Sheiks, who were the only actors that maintained a sphere of influence over and beyond tribal cleavages, filled this vacuum. Consequently, these local religious actors became mighty political leaders that emerged to represent the Kurds and Kurdishness, through an Islamic language<sup>27</sup>.

In addition to this, since 1984, south-eastern Turkey has faced an armed struggle between the PKK (Worker Party of Kurdistan) and the Turkish Armed Forces, which seems to be blocked, i.e., neither side could advance step further to gain advantage over the other<sup>28</sup>. This antagonistic condition has undermined the 'life chances' of Kurds. In addition to this, due to the continuous pressures on the legal pro-Kurdish parties<sup>29</sup> and the unconsidered acts of these, the channels for a peaceful solution were obstructed. Under these political conditions, the Islamist discourse, which promises a common denominator above and beyond ethnic identities, became attractive, since Islamic discourse enabled Kurds with the necessary means to integrate to the mainstream political and social life without giving up their difference in terms of language and cultural practices. To put it differently, Kurds who could not integrate themselves to the republic as "Kurds" and who do not sympathize the PKK-KADEK, perceived the Islamic movement as the only means of social mobility and integration<sup>30</sup>. As Cizre Sakallıoğlu<sup>31</sup> argues, Islam, today, is rather a binding tie between the Turks and the Kurds than a mark of "Kurdish Other" as it was in the 1930s.

The third group within the Islamic movement is the peripheral entrepreneurs, which have a conservative worldview and a long-lasting interest conflict with the large-scale industrialists of Istanbul. This group, which seeks to get a larger share from the globalising economy constructed alliance with the Islamic parties<sup>32</sup>. In correspondence to this, Öniş<sup>33</sup> emphasizes the role of emerging global economy and its cultural impulses for promoting the rise of Islamic parties in Turkey. He argues that structural aspects of the economic and cultural spheres provided the identity groups and communities with the necessary means to express their differences and organize themselves around their particular identities. Similar to Öniş, Shambayati<sup>34</sup> underlines the economic background of the Islamic groups in Turkey and claims that they are adopting an Islamic language for guarding their economic interests against the state policies, which favours the Istanbulite capital<sup>35</sup>. In fact until the 1980s this group was a marginal one within Turkish politics, only after this time their importance in terms of political and economic power increased.

During the 1983-1991 period, through the utilization of their ties with the conservative wing in the ANAP (Motherland Party)<sup>36</sup>, peripheral entrepreneurs succeeded in increasing their economic resources, which made them in return central actors within Turkish politics. As a result, peripheral entrepreneurs, who had been excluded from the governmental circles, articulated themselves into the centre and accumulated a great amount of capital<sup>37</sup>. In the 1990s, this economic wealth was utilized in favour of the Islamic movement that developed a discourse, defending the interest of provincial entrepreneurs. This alliance is crucial due to the fact that the existence of such an independent economic resource became decisive in the 1990s as a result of the introduction of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) programs, which took the control of the state expenditures from the party in power. Indeed, the importance of the peripheral entrepreneurs lies in the fact that they are the major suppliers where the state resources have been vanishing.

It has to be noted that though the economic resources provided by the peripheral entrepreneurs are important, these are not the only resources of the Islamic movement. In fact, the Islamic movement utilizes several resources. These are: the increased economic prosperity of the religious orders, the income accumulated by the Islamic interest-free banking, increased economic activities with the Gulf States (till 1991), and lastly, the money collected from the Turkish workers living in Europe<sup>38</sup>. As a result, the Islamic movement became one of the most prosperous political movements in Turkey.

Up to this point, we have defined and explored three groups: the Islamic intelligentsia, the Kurds, and the peripheral entrepreneurs. It is clear that each group has a particular role within the 'Islamic whole'. To put it clearly, without the ideological guidance of the Islamic intellectuals or without the Kurdish votes, it would be impossible for the Islamic movement to extend its sphere of influence. Moreover, without the economic backup of the peripheral entrepreneurs the Islamic movement could not have been able to gain an institutional strength, which enabled the penetration of the Islamic movement into the wider society. However, speaking in terms of numbers, the most significant element that made the success of the Islamic movement available is the support of the urban poor<sup>39</sup>. It has to be noted that the support of the urban poor is indispensable for electoral success since 1973 as result of its size<sup>40</sup>. According to the 1990 census, there are 5.14 million voters in the squatter settlements, *gecekondu*s, making up the 17 percent of the national electorate. Regarding the proportional representational system of Turkish political system, this percentage connotes a large voting bloc and Islamic parties utilized this huge reservoir of votes in the elections<sup>41</sup>. Indeed, it is legitimate to conceptualise the urban poor as the stem of the Islamic engine. Therefore, in the proceeding part of the article, the particular rationale of this group will be analyzed.

The literature dealing with the inclination of the urban poor towards the Islamic movement emphasizes the economic reasons and clientele redistributions over the ideological factors. For instance, Bayat<sup>42</sup> claims that the urban poor of Cairo, who are the main supporters of the Islamic movement, were not attracted by the “charm” of Islam, but by the indispensable search for the economic support, whichever source provides it. Consistently, the support of the urban poor to the Islamic movement in Turkey is explained by referring to the clientele redistributions such as food and fuel support<sup>43</sup>. As an example of these clientele relations we can mention the distribution of the basic foodstuff, provided by *Yimpaş*, a business corporation carrying a strong Islamic sentiment, during the fasting days in the squatter settlements of Ankara<sup>44</sup>. In brief, also we do claim that as a result of successfully utilized clientele relations, the ‘Islamic whole’ attracted the urban poor. However, there is an analytic deficiency in this explanation. That is, since the beginning of the multiparty system, clientele relations became one of the defining features of party-politics in Turkey<sup>45</sup>; so, why not any other party but Islamic parties and why not earlier but only in the recent decades have the Islamic parties achieved to acquire the support of the urban poor? We should note that there is no single explanation or a basic algebra, which can explain this support. Rather, we propose a multi dimensional explanation, which emphasizes three crucial factors. These are: 1) The vacuum created by the renouncement of the populist discourse by the centre left and centre right; 2) Structural transformation of the solidarity networks of the urban poor and 3) Organizational strength and talents of the Islamic movement. Nevertheless, the most important of all is the conjectural combination of these three factors.

After the initiation of the neo-liberal policies in the 1980s, the centre left and centre right parties converged gradually and they gave up their populist discourses. As a consequence, traditional supporters of these parties alienated in favour of the Islamic movement<sup>46</sup>, which remained as the only populist movement in the Turkish political arena. This improvement can be best understood if we investigate the discourse of *Adil Düzen*, literally “Just Order”<sup>47</sup> and lack of rival discourses

in the centre left and centre right. Indeed, several politicians both on the left and on the right wing have admitted this fact. For instance, İsmail Cem, a well known left wing politician, on 21 September 2003 stated that: "... [L]eft [in Turkey] could not claim its own sociological basis [the disadvantaged] and lost it. This situation started after the 1980 and continued throughout the 1990s. [The left] ceased to be a movement of its people anymore"<sup>48</sup>. It is striking to observe that it was in those years in which the right and left ceased to represent "its people", the disadvantaged, and the Islamic political movement started to gain support within this group.

In our point of view, this is the context in which the clientele relations between the urban poor and the Islamic movement flourished. In the following sections of the article we focus on the other two factors, the transformation of the solidarity networks of the urban poor and the organizational strength and talent of the Islamic movement. This will also enable us to provide a concrete picture of this alliance.

We have already mentioned the importance of the squatter settlers in Turkish politics, which constitute a significant block of votes. However, without dealing with the literature on the urbanisation and subsequent emergence of solidarity networks in Turkey, the conditions leading the urban poor to the Islamic movement cannot be understood. Therefore, the article employs the model developed by Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç that proposes a holistic picture of the solidarity networks and survival strategies of the urban poor. Basically, they claim that the main unit of the survival is the family, which is controlled by a centre, usually a patriarch that gathers the inflow and redistributes them according to a complex system of responsibilities and needs<sup>49</sup>. According to this model, the basic survival mechanism, the family pool, is fed by various sources such as child labour, kin support and so on. As it was demonstrated in the table (see, Appendix 1), there are fourteen interconnected sources that feed the system. A deficit in any

one of them strokes the system and creates a subsequent change in the character of it by leading to the intensification of the remaining sources or to the search of new ones.

As a result of the economic recession brought by the neo-liberal policies and structural adjustment programs initiated by the efforts of IMF, the survival strategies of the urban poor lived through a dramatic transformation. Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç<sup>50</sup> argue that, though the significance of the material support of relatives living abroad, child labour, extra income provided by woman through labouring in the domestic, and informal sector are preserved and even increased to some extent, social benefits such as health support, regular income from formal and informal sector, rural support, the provision of house and land, and educational support have declined sharply (see, Appendix 1). Any comparison of the relative economic significance of the increasing and decreasing resources would reveal that the resources, which are in decline provided the most significant support to the family pool. This infers that the shift in the availability of the resources is far from promoting upward mobility, as it was the case previously, or even maintaining the present economic status. Indeed, there is a clear indication of the fall of 'life chances' of the urban poor as a result of the imbalance between what is lost and what is gained. Therefore, the importance of the family pool, i.e. the first circle of the model is losing its importance by leaving the scene to the ethnic and religious cleavages.

In order to develop a framework, in which we can explain the rising importance of the ethnic and religious cleavages, a deeper analysis of the outer circles (see, Appendix 2) is necessary. Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç<sup>51</sup> mention several subunits of the model, which are effective in the outer circles. These are: townsmen/villager networks (*bemşehrilik*); neighbours, friends, fictive kinships, help from the employers; ethnic and religious networks; political parties/ organizations/ networks; support from the NGO's and finally the social benefits from the state

such as free education, health services, infrastructure facilities. These circles of networks are deeply interdependent and interpenetrated into each other.

Consequently, the resources, which were previously secondary -ethnic and religious networks, political parties, organizations and networks, and NGOs-, have increased their importance<sup>52</sup>. Although the significance of the resources provided by these networks can be neglectable in terms of their inputs, in a context where existing resources are vanishing, these are the omni-important means for the survival of the poor<sup>53</sup>. To put it clearly, in a zero-sum game, even a penny that can contribute to the network becomes crucial for fixing the living expenses. In fact, after the introduction of the neo-liberal policies of the 1980s and the recessions brought by the programs implemented by the IMF, the family pool system was destroyed and gave way to the emergence of ethnic and religious cleavages. Indeed, this is the primary dynamic for the evolution of the networks of the urban poor into ethnic and religious cleavages<sup>54</sup>.

We have already discussed the favourable political context, created by the absorption of the neo-liberal policy and renouncement of populism by the centre-right and centre-left and the structural transformation of the solidarity networks of the urban poor. This structural transformation of the solidarity networks to the ethnic and religious cleavages is the concrete basis on which the alliance between the Islamic movement and the urban poor is constructed. However, claiming those who have money can acquire the support of the urban poor; irrelevant of any other factor is impossible. Beside the material distributions, the organizational model of the Islamic movement should be investigated. Simply, whereas rival political actors lack an organizational system, which is able to reach the urban poor, the Islamic movement had already developed the appropriate mechanism, in which the women played the key role. The organizational model of the Islamic movement is called *Tespib Modeli*, literally the Model of Rosary. Like the beads, linked

by the chain of the rosary, this organizational model is composed of different organizational units that are connected by the centralized party organization. The model creates a strong chain-like organizational structure from top-to-bottom, which is extended from the administrative provinces to districts and villages, city quarters, even to streets and individual apartments<sup>55</sup>. This complex organizational model is described as:

The party maintained a *divan* (council) in every district comprising 50 regular and 50 alternate members. In addition, there were neighbourhood representatives who maintained a database of information on everyone living in that area, including details of each family unit. There was also a network of headmasters and teachers (*batipler ve ogretmenler*), who engaged people in discussion at the local coffee-houses and other gathering places<sup>56</sup>.

In fact, “the party is presided over a network of independent, interlocking support groups that was the envy of all other parties.”<sup>57</sup> The chain-like structure of the model connects the individual families bound through the neighbourhood ties to the local level organizations that have Islamic sentiments and via these organizations to the local level organization such as municipalities or NGOs that are active in the districts or in the particular quarters of the cities. The units of the Model of Rosary are exactly coinciding with the circles of the model of Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç. It has to be remembered that the survival of the Model of Rosary is dependent to the continuous flow of information from bottom to top, which increased the ability of the Islamic movement to adopt to the changing conditions. For instance, White<sup>58</sup> mentions the existence of a religious endowment, which enables the flow of information between the Islamic municipality and squatter settlers. Through the utilization of this network, the municipality provides jobs to the prospect sympathizers, who are in need. Such a network spread almost into every neighbourhood was not seen in any other party in the Turkish political arena<sup>59</sup>. Within this information network the role of the party organization is central. Only through the systematic information stored in the party headquarters, the model guaranteed its survival.

In this organizational model, the women activists who have been equipped with the Just Order discourse are the primary agents that constructed and maintained the ties with the urban poor. This role of women shows a strong correspondence with the model developed by Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, which defines the woman as the agent of networking<sup>60</sup>. (see, Appendix 2) Definitely, only through the informal activities of women, Islamic movement became able to reach the urban poor. The fundamental strategy employed by the women's commission is to get in touch with the locally influential 'ladies' and reach the masses through the network of these ladies<sup>61</sup>. Initially, they get in touch with the outer circles of the neighbourhood network, then with the fictive and real kinship, and then to the individual families via the female member. At that level, the regular female gatherings, local weddings and meetings of religious orders mainly populated by the women constitute the most lucrative fields for penetrating to the local community. When such a network is not possible or do not let the party to penetrate to the whole district, the members of the women's commission travel door to door for initiating and if possible registering residents to the party. A typical argument employed for charming the prospective members to the party is promising material and moral support for the party members. This support can be extended from health services to the contributions to their daughters' dowries or to the wedding expenses<sup>62</sup>. For instance, Secor<sup>63</sup> mentions cases of gifting gold for registering to the party or for praising the newborn baby. Also it is possible to encounter with the cases in which the party member or a close kin of her/him was sent to Germany for getting health services paid by the party organization<sup>64</sup>.

In fact, the women carried the succeeding Islamic parties from the margins of the Turkish politics to the centre. Indeed, this role of the women commission can be seen in the cross tabulation of the votes gathered by the Islamic movement and activities of women's commissions. To speak in numbers, between 1995 and 1997 female members of the Islamic party of the time (RP) increased from 158,287 to 377,888 and within 6 years, the female commission

registered more than one million members to the party<sup>65</sup>. Surprisingly, when the first women commission was initiated by the struggles of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 1987, the head of the Istanbul Organization of the Virtue party of the time, he was heavily criticized by the traditionalist wing within the party. Paradoxically, after the dramatic defeat of the traditionalist wing which is embodied in the SP (Felicity Party) in the last elections, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of SP declared in a speech in a meeting of the women commission of the SP: “To the mercy of the God, if you neglect working you will be under great responsibility...The women members of the SP has been always the engine of our struggle”<sup>66</sup>. As a result, it is possible to claim that through the activation of women networks within the complex organizational system the Islamic movement became able to penetrate into the networks of the urban poor, which in return enabled the electoral success of the movement.

The phenomenon of the “Islamic revival” in Turkey has been a popular subject among the scholars from various disciplines. The increasing political power of the Islamic movement indicates that the subject will remain popular in the proceeding years as well. Consequently, there is a growing literature that tries to document and explain the riddle of the Islamic movement. Although the results and approaches proposed in the literature provide the students of the Islamic movement with tools to understand the phenomenon, still, there are prevalent deficiencies within the literature. These are: totalisation, de-contextualisation and de-concretisation. As a result, there is need for a new standpoint, which considers the societal basis of the “Islamic revival”. This study emerged out of an inquiry for such a standpoint.

In line with the deficiencies we discussed above, instead of rejecting the existing literature, the article relocated various perspectives contributing to the literature. Basically, we examined the Islamic movement by dividing it into layers, which are the macro ideal types for analyzing

particular rationales of the supporting segments: Islamic intelligentsia, The Kurds, peripheral entrepreneurs and the urban poor. We elaborated different literatures focusing on a particular dimension of the “Islamic revival” and applied them to understand the particular rationale of the individual layers constituting the ‘Islamic whole’. Simply, we claimed that the intersection of these rationales made up the mortar of the Islamic movement.

For explaining the inclination of the Islamic intelligentsia towards the Islamic movement, we emphasised the literature on identity politics. Similarly, by following the works of political economists, we explained the support of the peripheral entrepreneurs within the convergence of the search of the Islamic movement for a powerful financier and the search of the peripheral entrepreneurs for an advocate of their economic interest. The tendency of the Kurds was explained by emphasizing the historical and contemporary political conditions in the southeastern Turkey. Finally, in agreement with the literature, the alliance between the urban poor and the Islamic movement was investigated within the clientele relations formed in the context of the urban periphery. However, consistent with the deficiency in the literature, the article focused on the most commonly mentioned but least explored group, the urban poor. We claimed that the support of the urban poor is acquired as a result of three contingent events: the favourable ideological ground cleaned from the centre left and centre right parties due to their absorption of the neo liberal discourse, the changing characteristics of the solidarity networks of the urban poor, i.e., their transformation into ethnic and religious cleavages, and finally, the ability of the Islamic movement to read this transformation properly and develop appropriate mechanisms to utilize these networks for its own political purposes. However, it should be reminded that the utilization of the networks could not be attained without the strong organizational model of the Islamic movement and the spectacular utilization of the female networks, which enabled the interactive dialog between the urban poor and the Islamic movement that was absent in any other political movement. Precisely, the Islamic movement was in the right place; organized within the

squatter settlements, at the right time; when the centre left and centre right parties lost their populist discourses, with the appropriate means to penetrate into the networks of the poor; the Model of Rosary and the women activists.

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<sup>1</sup> We define the Islamic movement as the totality of relations formed among the actors adopted an Islamic language, which enabled the electoral victory of the Islamic parties and the infiltration of the Islamic discourse to the public sphere.

<sup>2</sup> See Haldun Gülalp, 'Refah Partisinin Yükselişi', in Haldun Gülalp (ed.), Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri (İstanbul: Metis, 2003), pp.61-76; Ziya Öniş, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective', Third World Quarterly, Vol.18, No.4 (1997), pp. 743-766; Hootan Shambayati, 'The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran', Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, (1994), pp.307-331.

<sup>3</sup> See Çağlar Keyder, 'Whither Project of Modernity? : Turkey in the 1990s', in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle; London: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp.37-51; E. Fuat Keyman, 'On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: the Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey', New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol.13 (1995), pp.93-120.

<sup>4</sup> See Uğur Akıncı, 'The Welfare Party's Municipal Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey', Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No.1 (1999), pp.77-91; Sencer Ayata, 'Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey', Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No.1 (1996), pp.40-56.

<sup>5</sup> Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç, 'Yapısal Uyum Programlarıyla Ortaya Çıkan Yoksullukla Başetme Stratejileri', in Ahmet Alpay Dikmen (ed.), Kentleşme Göç ve Yoksulluk(7. Ulusal Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi) (Ankara: İmaj, 2002), pp.197-247. The tables provided in this article (Appendix 1 and 2) are the modified version of the original table presented by Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç for the sake of a more tangible figure. For the original see Appendix 3.

<sup>6</sup> See Şerif Mardin, Din ve İdeoloji (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Nilüfer Göle, Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme (İstanbul: Metis, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> General Fevzi Türkeri in a briefing to journalists on 11 June 1997 stated that "The reactionary sector has been continuing its activities towards broadening its power of appeal in the society through 19 newspapers, 110 journals, 51 radio and 20 television ... 2,500 associations, 500 foundations, over 1,000 business corporations, 1,200 student dormitories, over 800 private schools and courses ... The figure of those attending officially registered Koran courses is 1,685,000 and this figure doubles in every five years" quoted in Muzaffer Şahin, MGK, 28 Şubat Öncesi ve Sonrası (Ankara: Ufuk Kitabevi, 1998). p.119.

<sup>9</sup> MUSIAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association) was established in 1990 with a significant Islamic sentiment. Today, it has more than 2000 members and 26 offices. It is the second largest business association after the TUSIAD (Industrialists and Businessmen Association of Turkey). Due to the Islamist sentiment of MUSIAD, some prefer to read the abbreviation: MUSIAD as Muslim Industrialists and Businessmen Association. For further information see Faik Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesinin Yükselişi (Ankara: Doruk, 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Ayata, 'Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey', p.52.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), p.5.

<sup>12</sup> Respectively these parties are MNP (National Order Party) (1970-1971), MSP (National Salvation Party) (1972-1980), RP (Welfare Party) (1983-1998), VP (Virtues Party) (1997-2001). Currently, there are two rival parties; SP (Felicity Party) under the leadership of Erbakan, who has been the continuous leader of the parties, mentioned until here and symbolizes the traditionalist wing and AKP (Justice Development Party) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who symbolises the younger-revisionist generation. As the last elections demonstrated the revisionist wing is the centre of gravity. Whereas AKP acquired 34.2 percent of the total votes and 363 seats of 550, SP remained at 2.49 and could not win any seat due to the ten percent threshold in Turkey.

<sup>13</sup> Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London; New York: Verso, 1993), p.1.

<sup>14</sup> For instance, Erdoğan claims that Islam was suppressed by pathologic understanding of the Kemalism, was invisible in the Turkish public sphere. According to him, only after the democratisation of Turkey Islam became public. He calls this process as the revival of the already exiting Islam. Mustafa Erdoğan, 'Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey's Quest for Democracy without Islam', Critique, Vol.15 (1999), pp. 25-49. Similarly, Yavuz claims that whenever the democratisation attempts increase Islam emerges and whenever the military-

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bureaucratic elite intervene to politics, Islam turns out to be invisible. Hakan Yavuz, 'Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere', Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.1 (2000), pp.21-43.

<sup>15</sup> Shambayati, 'The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran'.

<sup>16</sup> Jeremy Salt, 'Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.1 (1995), pp.13-27.

<sup>17</sup> Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, p.1.

<sup>18</sup> See Nilufer Narlı, 'The Rise of Islamist Movement in Turkey', MERIA, Vol.3, No.3 (1999); Binnaz Toprak, 'Surviving Modernization: Islam as a Communal Means of Adaptation', Il Politico, Vol.1 (1991), pp.147-161.

<sup>19</sup> For instance, Narlı mentions upwardly mobile youth, unskilled young urban proletariat, state-employed petit bourgeoisie, new middle and upper classes in Anatolia, sectors of ultra-nationalists, and Sunni Kurds. See Narlı. 'The Rise of Islamist Movement in Turkey'; Çakır emphasizes the youth, women, Kurdish nationalists, Turkish nationalists, conservative entrepreneurs, urban poor, and intellectuals as the constituencies of the Islamic movement. Ruşen Çakır, 'The Second Return to Religion', Private View, Vol.8 (2000), pp.42-47. We argue that examining the particular rationales of these groups provides the required ideal types to create a holistic picture of the contemporary Islamic movement, though it is possible to increase the number of subgroups by making detailed investigations on these main groups.

<sup>20</sup> Haldun Gülalp, 'İslamın Siyasal İdeoloji Olarak Kullanımı', in Haldun Gülalp (ed.), Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri (İstanbul: Metis, 2003), pp. 24-41. In fact, besides this newly emerging Islamic intelligentsia, there is a group of traditionalist Islamists that still effect the Islamic movement, though gradually losing its importance. This small group of fundamentalist / radical Muslims and conservative Islamists share a similar hostile "ideological" stand against the hegemonic secular worldview of the state, but show a great deviation in terms of ideological stand. Sami Zubaida, 'Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey', The Political Quarterly, Vol.71 (2000), p.74.

<sup>21</sup> Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp.1-12.

<sup>22</sup> Keyder, 'Whither Project of Modernity? : Turkey in the 1990s'.

<sup>23</sup> Keyman, 'On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: the Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) identity in Turkey'.

<sup>24</sup> Akıncı, 'The Welfare Party's Municipal Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey', p.90. Similarly, Barkey notes that "[t]he islamists and Kurdish questions are somewhat linked today". Henri Barkey, 'The Struggles of a "Strong State"', Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.1 (2000), p.102.

<sup>25</sup> Ümit Cizre Sakalioğlu, 'Kurdish Nationalism From an Islamist Perspective: The Discourses of Turkish Islamist Writers', Journal of Muslim Affairs, Vol.18, No.1 (1998), pp73-89.

<sup>26</sup> However, the role of Islam among the Kurds is questionable. For instance the report published by TOBB (Chambers and Trade of Turkey), shows that the claimed allegiance to religious leaders or communitarianism among the Kurdish respondents is only 8.7 per cent. Moreover, according to the same report, 10.5 percent of the Kurds stated that the Islamic identity is unimportant. Özel Araştırma Raporu. *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dizisi. Doğu Sorunu Teşhisler*. (1995).

<sup>27</sup> Mesut Yeğen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu (İstanbul; İletişim, 1999).

<sup>28</sup> The recent event that indicates this situation is the so called "Law of Penitence" (*Pişmanlık Yasası*) that has been in force since 6 August 2003 with great hopes to discharge especially the armed militant cadres of the PKK-KADEK turned out to be unsuccessful. By the 5 September 2003 the number of applications in the southeastern region in order to benefit from this law was recorded as 832. However, 771 of these applications were made by the militants who had already been arrested or condemned, 613 of applications were made by PKK-KADEK members. (Radikal, 5 September 2003). So, in terms of numbers only 61 active militants are applied concerning the law. Considering the fact that there are active terrorist organizations other than PKK-KADEK, such as Hizbullah, IBDA-C and TIKKO, the number of the applications made by the active PKK-KADEK militants must be even lower than 61. Regarding the 4500-5000 estimated number of active PKK-KADEK militants (Radikal, 14 October 2003), it is certain that the law turned out to be a fiasco for solving the "Kurdish problem".

<sup>29</sup> The pro-Kurdish parties are respectively; HEP (People's Labour Party) (1990-1993), DEP (Democracy Party) (1993-1994), DDP (Democracy and Change Party) (1995-1996), DKP (Democratic Mass Party) (1997-1999), HADEP (People's Democracy Party) (1994-2003), DEHAP (Democratic People's Party) (1997-2005), and since 2005 to present DTP (Democratic Society Party).

<sup>30</sup> Haldun Gülalp. 'Tarihsel Perspektiften İslamcılık', in Haldun Gülalp (ed.), Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri (İstanbul: Metis, 2003), pp.9-24; Hamit Bozarlan, 'Turkey's Elections and the Kurds', Middle East Report, Vol.199 (1996), p.18.

<sup>31</sup> Ümit Cizre Sakalioğlu, 'Kurdish Nationalism From an Islamist Perspective: The Discourses of Turkish Islamist Writers'. p.86.

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<sup>32</sup> Gülalp, 'Tarihsel Perspektiften İslamcılık', p.12; Yavuz, 'Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey', Comparative Politics, Vol.30, No.1 (1997), p.72

<sup>33</sup> Öniş, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective'.

<sup>34</sup> Shambayati, 'The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran'.

<sup>35</sup> In fact, such a conflict between peripheral entrepreneurs, adopting an Islamic outlook, and central entrepreneurs can be traced back to the seizure of the TOBB (Chamber of Commerce and Trade of Turkey) by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of Islamic party of the period (1969), MSP (National Salvation Party). Henri Barkey, The State and Industrialization Crises in Turkey (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p.132.

<sup>36</sup> ANAP (Motherland Party), which is established in 1983, claimed to combine four main tendencies, Islamism, liberalism, nationalism and social democracy under the conservative worldview and acquired the absolute majority of the votes in the first elections (1983) after the military takeover. Motherland Party initiated the liberalization process in Turkey. The coalition continued between the Motherland Party and Islamic entrepreneurs till the election of Mesut Yılmaz (1991), who embarked on a purging manoeuvre against these networks, as the party chairman in 1991. Ayata, 'Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey'. p.46.

<sup>37</sup> Toprak, 'Surviving Modernization: Islam as a Communal Means of Adaptation', p.157.

<sup>38</sup> See Öniş, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey'; Yavuz, 'Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey'; Birol Yeşilada, 'The Virtue Party in Turkey', in Bary Rubin and Metin Heper (eds.), Turkish Political Parties (London: Frank Cass. 2002), pp.62-81.

<sup>39</sup> It is commonly agreed that in the Middle East, the success of the Islamic movement is based on the support of the rural-to-urban migrants and the urban poor. See Joan M. Nelson, Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in the Developing Nations (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). For a discussion about the role of migrant in the Turkish setting see Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yıldızoğlu, 'The resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey' in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political Islam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp.144-153.

<sup>40</sup> Kemal Karpat, 'Turkish Democracy at Impasse: Ideology, Party Politics and The Third Military Intervention', International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol.2, No.1 (1981), p. 18.

<sup>41</sup> The electoral success of the RP in 1995 (21.4 percent) was achieved by the support of the urban poor. S. Ilgu Özler, 'Politics of the Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in National Elections', Turkish Studies, Vol.1, No.2 (2000), p.40.

<sup>42</sup> Asef Bayat, 'Activism and Social Development in the Middle East', International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.34 (2002), pp.1-28.

<sup>43</sup> Levent Köker, 'Local Politics and democracy in Turkey: an appraisal', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.540,(July) (1995), pp.51-62 Akıncı, 'The Welfare Party's Municipal Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey', pp75-94.

<sup>44</sup> A previous activist of the Islamic movement told this event during an informal interview (June 2003, Ankara).

<sup>45</sup> The exchange of votes in return of material benefits became the common way of making politics in Turkey, since the introduction of multi-party system. Consistent with this, one of the objectives of the 1980 military coup was declared to eliminate the deep-rooted clientele networks and to clean the Turkish politics. However, in contrast, clientele relations increased their importance and became the golden rule for a successful party. Schüler cited in Z. Şahin, Clientelist Relations in Urban Sphere: A Turkish Case, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Ankara: Middle East Technical University, Department of Urban Policy Planning and Local Government, 1999), p.97.

<sup>46</sup> Basically the incapacity of the centre-left parties to fulfil their social democratic duties created an advantageous position for the Islamic movement. Özler, 'Politics of the Gecekondu in Turkey: The Political Choices of Urban Squatters in National Elections' pp.39-58; Öniş, 'The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey', p.748. In such a context, Islamic Party imitated the practice of the CHP (Republican Peoples Party) in the 1970s and "conquered" the traditional "fortresses" of the social democrats. Haldun Gülalp, 'Küreselleşme ve Siyasal İslam', in Haldun Gülalp (ed.), Kimlikler Siyaseti: Türkiye'de Siyasal İslamın Temelleri (İstanbul: Metis, 2003), pp.54-55. The situation was not different for the centre right parties, which lost their capacity to fulfil the needs of their supporters. Narlı, 'The Rise of Islamist Movement in Turkey'.

<sup>47</sup> The Just Order discourse is basically a defence act of the economic interests of the disadvantaged against the privileged classes. It is a critique of the unjust capitalist system filled with Islamic concepts such as social solidarity, altruism etc. Due to these features, its target population, the urban poor, perceives Just Order, which promises economic justice, as a kind of a socialist system. Haldun Gülalp, 'Küreselleşme ve Siyasal İslam', p.55.

<sup>48</sup> Radikal, 22 September 2003.

<sup>49</sup> Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Helga Rittersberger-Tılıç, 'Intergenerational Solidarity Networks of Instrumental and Cultural Transfers Within Migrants Families in Turkey', Ageing and Society, Vol.20 (2000), p.532.

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- <sup>50</sup> Kalaycıođlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, ‘Yapısal Uyum Programlarıyla Ortaya Çıkan Yoksullukla Başetme Stratejileri’, pp.197-247.
- <sup>51</sup> Kalaycıođlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, ‘Yapısal Uyum Programlarıyla Ortaya Çıkan Yoksullukla Başetme Stratejileri’p.227.
- <sup>52</sup> Kalaycıođlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, ‘Yapısal Uyum Programlarıyla Ortaya Çıkan Yoksullukla Başetme Stratejileri’p.215.
- <sup>53</sup> White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, p.193.
- <sup>54</sup> Turgut Kerem Tuncel, Social and Spatial transformations in Contemporary Metropolises with a Focus on the Disadvantaged, Unpublished MA Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara, 2002), pp.96-107.
- <sup>55</sup> Çakır, Ne Şariat Ne Demokrasi, p.51.
- <sup>56</sup> Yeşilada, ‘The Virtue Party in Turkey’, p.70.
- <sup>57</sup> White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, p.180.
- <sup>58</sup> White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, pp.178-211.
- <sup>59</sup> Yavuz, ‘Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey’, p.77.
- <sup>60</sup> Kalaycıođlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç, ‘Yapısal Uyum Programlarıyla Ortaya Çıkan Yoksullukla Başetme Stratejileri’, p.227.
- <sup>61</sup> Arat, Yeşim, Political Islam in Turkey and Women's Organizations (İstanbul: TESEV, 1989), p.40.
- <sup>62</sup> Arat, Yeşim, Political Islam in Turkey and Women's Organizations, p.42.
- <sup>63</sup> Anna J Secor, ‘Towards a Feminist Counter-geopolitics: Gender, Space and Islamist Politics in Istanbul’, Space & Polity, Vol.5, No.3 (2001), p. 202.
- <sup>64</sup> Arat, Yeşim, Political Islam in Turkey and Women's Organizations, p.34.
- <sup>65</sup> Arat, Yeşim, Political Islam in Turkey and Women's Organizations, pp.9-23.
- <sup>66</sup> Hürriyet, 17 June 2003.