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“Indonesia’s Perilous Path of Democratization:
The Limits of Religious-based Social Capital in Democratic Transition”

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Abstract

Social Scientists have established that social capital is helpful in establishing, maintaining and allowing democracy to function. Both have an interdependent relationship. In line with this premise, many Indonesianists or students of Indonesian studies agree that with more than 25 million followers, Muhammadiyah, the largest modernist Islamic organisation in the world, with many layers of social capital has played significant role in the ongoing process of Indonesian democratization. The presence and potential of radical interpretations of Islam which undermine important-principle democratic values, such as tolerance and plurality, however, have generally been overlooked. This has, very likely, been responsible for the growing support for the agenda of radical Islam in Indonesian today.

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This paper will argue that while many Islamic organizations play significant role in socio-religious politics, from the perspective of social capital has to be highly appreciated, their connections and intermingling radical Islam has to be emphasised. Democratic transition which is supported by "religious-based social capital" in many cases has undoubtedly left the democratic trajectory in peril.

Introduction

The discussions of the role of social capital have heavily focused on the government-civil society relations. Relations between different groups of society in which social capital has also played important role have, unfortunately, been considered less significant. This academic gap seems to be caused by the overwhelming problems of people-government relations in the history of modern nation-state in most countries in the world. While problems caused by their own actions can be solved without state intervention, many groups of people in many developing countries disregard their own ability and let the state handle the problems. Or, they let the ruling majority take initiatives alone. This is not a healthy feature of a democratic society.

In regions where there is a majority religious group which has potential to gain power through procedural democratic elections, minority groups can be vulnerable if the ruling majority does not take the rights of the minority into account. However, when such a situation takes place one may not simply accuse neither the majority nor the

minority alone or accuse that it is a bitter fruit of freedom in democratic society. This leads to the question “why?” and “how?” it is so. The roots of the problems have to be firstly investigated.

To study this premise in an empirical manner, this paper will bring a fresh example from Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world and the so called promising democratic Islamic country. In the last few years after the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime, Indonesia has faced an increase of *Shari’a* PERDA². In some provinces and districts of the country, Perda is a process of making Regional Codes or Regulations based on particular interpretation of Islamic *shari’a* as opposed to shared universal values among religious believers. This mushrooming of *shariah*-based PERDA in Indonesia is *par excellence* of such phenomena where the ruling majority can undermine minority rights or at least what the latter claimed and complained. Until recently, there are at least ten regions in five provinces in the country that have introduced *shari’a* law in their regional regulations – despite the presence of non-Muslims in those regions. They are Aceh and West Sumatra in Sumatera; Banten, Tangerang, Cianjur and Garut in Java, Banjar and Banjarmasin in South Kalimantan; and Gowa, Wajo and Bulukumba in South Sulawesi

² PERDA stands for *Peraturan Daerah* or Regional Regulations.

province. There are some other provinces that are now in the wait-and-see situation, but they seem to follow the “slippery” path.³

It is undeniable that the *shari’a-isation* of PERDA is a product of the euphoric freedom that followed the collapse of the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. Procedural democracy has been deployed by well-educated radical Muslims to exercise their radical activism. One has to be reminded, however, that while freedom has to be preserved, its limitation has also to be loudly voiced in order not to let it (freedom) develop on the wrong track. Procedural democracy, i.e. elections, can not be taken for granted to solve the day to day problems of society, particularly where the majority of its people are not well informed of the consequences of political decisions in which they are involved. To a certain degree, Indonesians belong to this kind of society.

An intriguing factor that has led me to the present focus of this paper originally came out of the interviews conducted with a number of Muhammadiyah leaders in South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Jambi (Sumatera) during my field works for my PhD thesis in March-April 2004, March-April 2005 and June 2006. As one can see that geographically speaking, the three islands or regions where my study

³ While I am writing this section, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the released JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) cleric attended the declaration of KPSI (Committee of the Implementation of Islamic *Syari’a*) in Padang, West Sumatra, the province of the biggest Muhammadiyah followers. See *Republika online* available at www.republika.co.id accessed on 27 July 2006.

takes place well surround Java islands which are the center, the symbol of Indonesian national integrity. Therefore, the growing support of *shari'a-isation* of PERDA in many regions surrounding Java can be seen as an alarming signal of what is called as "periphery surrounds the center."⁴ This may be the long-term target of shari'a supporters but it is undoubtedly an alarming development for others. With regard to the questions related to democratic values, such as tolerance, plurality, freedom, and liberty, we need to ask, what sort of role that Islam should play in Indonesian politics. A number of my interviewees strongly rejected the idea of "democracy" who then furiously expressed their animosity to the policy of Western World, particularly the US and its allies, toward Islamic world such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. They argued that if such democratic values really work, the US and its allies would not have done what they have been doing.

While I was contemplating for quite sometime about what the responses of my interviewees told me, I was alerted to the ongoing developments in Indonesia, the growing of strong support to the discourses, proposals and movements of the implementation *shari'a-*

⁴ See Barrington Moore Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, pp. 224-227, see also Arbi Sanit "Desa Mengepung Kota?" at <http://www.tempo.co.id/> accessed on 10 August 2006 and Asrori S. Karni dan Bernadetta Febriana, dan Anthony "Gelora Syariah Mengepung Kota" at <http://www.gatra.com/> accessed on 10 August 2006

based PERDA. I then asked myself whether there are connections between their responses and what went on later in those regions? Who are the supporters of *Shari'a-isation*? Why are they so strong and make the processes of discussing the draft of particular regulations so easy and quick? Are they new in those regions? If yes, why are they so keen to implement the *shari'a* law? If they are not new people in those regions then why *now* that the ideas of solving problems they face have to be through promoting and propagating *shari'a-isation* of PERDA? What are the main factors that lead them to propose *Shari'a* Codes? And what kind of capital that has helped them to gain such strong support for this course?

In this paper I would like to put emphasis on social capital. I will argue that this has become the basis for such movements that so far have been relatively successful. By procedural democracy, one will encounter serious problems when one judges that the process of creating the regional regulations (PERDA) is not democratic. Most of them, if not all, have fulfilled the prerequisites of essential principles of procedural democracy. So what are the problems?

A number of critics toward a one-sided view on social capital, on its positive aspect have been dedicated by serious scholars on this

theory.⁵ This also holds true on the relations between social capital and religion.⁶ However, what is still lacking is the view from the angle of “binding” and “bridging” which is based on religious beliefs. This is what the present paper seeks to fulfill.

Religious-based Social capital

In this section of the paper, I attempt to justify particular definitions that are referred to. Putnam (1993) defines social capital as 'features of *social organisation*, such as *trust*, *norms*, and *networks* that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating *coordinated actions*' (1993 p. 167). This definition suggests three central elements; an *actor* which is *social organization*, *outcome* which is *trust*, *norms*, and *networks* and *output* which is *coordinated actions*. Comparatively, Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1986) perceive Social capital as the

5 See for example Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza, and Ana Maria Menendez. "Violent crime: does social capital matter?" in *Economic Development & Cultural Change* 50.3 (April 2002): pp. 509-539 and Martin Aberg and Mikael Sandberg, *Social Capital and Democratization: Roots of Trust in Post-Communist Poland and Ukraine* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

6 For example Andrew M. Greeley, "The other civic America: religion and social capital." *The American Prospect* 32 (May-June 1997): pp. 68-73, Wood, R.L., and M.R. Warren. "A different face of faith-based politics: social capital and community organizing in the public arena." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 22.9 (Sept 1, 2002) pp. 6-54 and Myers, Scott M. "The Impact of Religious Involvement on Migration, *Social Forces* 79.2 (Dec 2000): pp. 755-783.

outcome of the process of interaction. Bourdieu provides the definition of Social capital (1986) as follows:

... the *aggregate* of the *actual* or *potential resources* which are linked to possession of a *durable network* of more or less *institutionalised relationship* of mutual *acquaintance* and *recognition*--or in other words, to *membership in a group*—which provides each of its members with the collectivity owned capital pp. 248-249).

Sociologists, such as Durkheim (1915) argue that the very nature of religions is social. Therefore, *social organization* includes religious organization. By referring to trust, norms, and networks in Putnam's definition of Social capital warrants further elucidation, one can be faced by further explanations or questions, such as on what basis trust, norms and networks are built. Any answer to this question will ultimately determine what the immediate and long term goals of the *coordinated actions*.

Relevance to the focus of the discussion of the paper, Muslims organized themselves in particular platform of religious organizations for many reasons. As far as goals of those who join or tend to affiliate to an organization is concerned, they can be put into the category of long term goals, short term goals and the mixture of the two. But one thing that has to be added here is that unlike secular-base of Social capital which is horizontal in its character, as Putnam suggested,

religious-based Social capital also has a vertical dimension – this is the religious believer’s connection with their God. For “radical” religious believers, God’s interest is absolute, above anything else. In other words they are bound by God’s interests. Ultimately, when such interests are embedded as capital and are used for particular goals it is very often on the expense of those who do not belong to the same religion.

Briefly, by *radical Islam* or *Muslim* in this paper, I will refer to Islam or Muslims who tend to regard that their interpretation of Islam as the only correct version of Islam and all the others have to follow them otherwise their Islam is unacceptable. Whether it is propagated, promoted or protected by means of violence or only verbally, the presence of violence is not necessarily important. In other words, *radical Islam* does not necessarily mean the same as *Islamic radicalism*. Forcing other religious believers to obey Islamic *shari’a* or other Muslims to obey particular interpretation of Islam is part of *radical* interpretation of Islam.

For the short-term goals, members or activists of particular religious organizations use their organizations to gain economic, political, and other social and pragmatic interests. For the long-term goals, members or activists of religious organizations use their organizations

for the sake of spreading religious beliefs and teachings, including to implementing Islamic *shari'a*. Radical Islam usually claims to promote and protect the interests of God. However, there are religious organizations which merge the two goals which sometimes are complicated to be examined. In other words, religious-based social capital has different sources, dimensions and to some extent also different goals.

Andrew M. Greeley (1997) poses an important question regarding source of social capital: "is religious practice a source of social capital?" Greeley then demonstrates that it is so. He contends that "Religious structures generate social capital that motivates people to volunteer, especially those who already have *idealistic* orientations."⁷

In referring to religious structures that generate Social capital that can motivate people who already have *idealistic orientations*, it is not only limited to horizontal dimension of volunteering, but also to the vertical dimension as mentioned elsewhere. Members of religious organization can make use their networks, norms, and trust to be invested for the sake of God's Blessing and Mercy. Therefore, as a resource, religious-based Social capital is something that people can use for further achievements of goals which to very large extent, is in the same

⁷ Andrew M. Greeley, "The other civic America: religion and social capital." *The American Prospect* n32 (May-June 1997 n32), p. 70.

manner of economic capital. Money, for example, can be used to buy a house and religious-based capital, such as trust is used to deliver a religious message for further goals.

When Social capital becomes limited

Social scientists who use Social capital as a model of analysis have found that it does not only have positive ends but also negative aspects and consequences (for example Aberg & Sandberg 2003, Adler & Kwon 2000, Martin 2000 and Portes and Landolt 1996)). Portes and Landolt have suggested some specific negative aspects of Social capital. Firstly, both assert that the strong ties that bind a group together to enable it to succeed but also potential to reject other members of society and place those rejected at substantial disadvantage. Secondly, membership of any community often comes at the price of conformity to the norms and values of the community and the placing of restrictions on individual freedom and expression.⁸ This is particularly true in the case of religious-based Social capital.

Regarding religious-based social capital, despite the positive effect of religion on well-being and health society in general (Ellison et al.

⁸ Andrew Woodhouse, 'People are accepted as long as they don't misbehave': exploring the relationship between Social capital and crime in rural Australia. *Rural Society* 16.1 (Spring 2006): pp.5-25

2001), there have been a number of studies that have pointed out that religion can also have a negative impact (Meador et al. 1992).

Further, Coleman (1988) suggests that dense connections between parties within a group facilitate the development of self-enforcing norms and trust within a collective allowing the group to more easily attain communal goals. When communal goals are gained through a lawful process, such goals cannot be considered as negative, but they limit the interests of others or they can be limited to the interests of limited groups of people at the expense of others. This is particularly true in the religious life in which every religion has its own goals.

In looking at the limits of social capital, I partially agree with what many scholars have reminded us of - that Social capital has *its dark side*. I refer to this as the *limits* of Social capital. The difference between "negative" or "dark side" and the limits of Social capital lies on the perspective we use to look at the Social capital. One can say that a *thing* is negative in one side while others will see the same thing as positive from other sides or one might judge thing as dark just because he or she is blocked to see the bright side from other perspective. Only those who can make themselves distant from self-vested interests who can see both sides at the same time. For example, if one group of a society uses their networks, "particular

values” internal trust and other features of Social capital to win a political competition, after which they could undermine those who are defeated, for them this process is a victory but can also be a disaster for those who are defeated. This can not be categorized negative or dark side from the perspective of the former but more as the limits of Social capital.

Muhammadiyah and Multiple Layers of Social Capital

Muhammadiyah (lit. followers of the Prophet Muhammad) was established in 1912 by KH Ahmad Dahlan, a Meccan graduate, with a clear aim to promote and protect the “purest” and the “truest” version of Islam and to abandon the “polluted” or “contaminated” version of Islam by referring *directly only* to the Qur’an and the *Hadith* (Prophet Traditions). For this every one is expected to conduct *ijtihad*. In Muhammadiyah’s preamble of platform reads “the aims and purposes of Muhammadiyah formation is to uphold and to hold Islam in high esteem so that the *truest Muslim community* can be realized” and “in order to realized such community, with God’s blessing and mercy and (we are) encouraged by God’s revelation in the Qur’an 3:104 “Let there *arise out of you a band of people* inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the

ones to attain felicity.” It continues “so that with *this* Muhammadiyah Muslim *ummah* can be taken to the gate of Heaven “*jannatun nai’im*.”

What does the concept of ‘*the truest Muslim community (masyarakat Islam yang sebenar-benarnya)*’ mean? There are a number of related qualifications that are usually quoted in this regard, but two stand out: “commending right and forbidding wrong” as mentioned elsewhere and “O ye who believe! Enter into Islam whole-heartedly *kaffah*); and follow not the footsteps of the evil one; for he is to you an avowed enemy” (Q2:208). Becoming a *kaffah* Muslim includes to implementing Islamic *shari’a* in the day-to-day life by means of directly consulting to the Qur’an and the Hadiths in dealing with every day life. It is true that devote Muslims, whatever organization they affiliate to, are generally aware about such notion of Islam, but there is no particular emphasis of indoctrination as what Islamic organization like Muhammadiyah does.

In addition, it has become common knowledge in Islamic community, particularly experts on Qur’anic and Hadith studies that there are many verses of Qur’an and of Hadiths that are revealed based on particular social and local conditions (*asbab al-nuzul* for the Qur’an and

asbab al-wurud for the Hadiths) and the implementation of which is conditional. This was what made most classic Ulama, namely *mufasssir* (Qur'anic interpreters) and *fuqaha* (jurists) argued that in order to be able to *understand* the Qur'an and Hadith adequately, particularly in conducting *ijtihad*, there must be some sorts of introduction in which particular prerequisites⁹ have to be established. For example, verses of the Qur'an and Hadiths of the Prophet that are conditional in nature cannot be blindly implemented without considering the historical background of the verses or Hadiths of the Prophet. Otherwise it can lead someone to totally different direction from what the Qur'an or Hadith really mean to. However, following Wahhabism traits and Muhammad Abduh, followers of Muhammadiyah are supposed to go directly to the Qur'an and the Hadith. Although most of religious practices of Muhammadiyah follow the school of Imam Ahmad ibn Hambal, rhetorically referring to *madhzhabs* (schools of Laws) is not relevant in its Islamic doctrine. Anti-TBC¹⁰ (*tachyul*, *bid'a* and *churafat*) movement used to perfectly fit to this organization.

⁹ Most medieval *ulama* agree that there are particular prerequisites in order one to conduct *ijtihad* though they differ in the numbers. Most, however, agreed that the most important requisite is knowledge related to Arabic and knowledge related to the Qur'an and the Hadith. See for example, Al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat fi usul al-shari'a*, Libanon: Darul Ma'rifa 1996 vol. 4, There are also contemporary studies that summarize classical opinions on this issue, see for example, Mahdī Fadl Allāh, *al-Ijtihād wa-al-mantiq al-fiqhā fi al-Islām*, Bayrūt : Dār al-Talī ah, 1987.

¹⁰ TBC is also the abbreviation of tuberculosis, a deadly disease that once threatened Indonesians.

Muhammadiyah, as an organization, is extension of the teachings, thoughts and Islamic reflections of Muhammad Ibn Abd Wahhab, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Ridha and Jamaluddin al-Afghani. The mixture of these influences together with the Indonesian local politics and religious problems around the time of its establishment has resulted in a "blurred" picture of this organization.¹¹ In other words I am not in total agreement with many Indonesianists who have put Muhammadiyah in a safe place of "modernist" Islam.¹² Throughout its history, it has sometimes gone to the most extreme side of Wahhabite corner of its ideology and in other times it has gone to the most extreme side of Abduh and Rashid Ridha's spectrum of Islamic thought. While still at some other times it has gone to the political corner of Pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin Al-Afghani. While the traits that drive Muhammadiyah to every corner remain potent, there are two main factors that have driven this organization to a particular corner at a particular time; the development of Indonesian political currents and the personal character of its leaders. Both factors have played

¹¹ See also Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," in *Southeast Asia Affairs*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: p. 105.

¹² See for example Alfian. Muhammadiyah : *The political behavior of a Muslim modernist organization under Dutch colonialism*, Yogyakarta, Indonesia : Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989, Mitsuo Nakamura, *The crescent arises over the banyan tree : a study of the Muhammadiyah movement in a central Javanese town*, Ann Arbor, Mich. : University Microfilms International, 1983 and Noer, Deliar. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1973.

important roles in making the victory of radical element during its National Congress July 2005.

Muhammadiyah's "tactically" cooperative attitudes toward the Dutch government, such as opening its door or receiving funds from the Dutch colonialists, adopting the Dutch ways of the day-to-day appearances and copying their structures of educational institutions have led many scholars or Indonesianists to put this organization into the category of modernist movement.¹³ By and large, any modern label has been associated not only with modern Europeans but also the West in general. This ultimately creates the image of Muhammadiyah as modernist movement which is very much similar to the modern West. Every one is overshadowed by this label.

Scholars who have conducted research on Muhammadiyah have "procedurally" searched and used the previous studies for their literature review. The above image has blocked them to find any clue to bring them to pass through a path that the radical Islamic movements or leaders have any association with this "moderate" Muhammadiyah. None of the previous studies has really provided a clear definition of *moderate* Islam when the term is referred to both

13 See for example Deliar Noer, Noer, Deliar. *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942*. Singapore : Oxford University Press, 1973 and Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*. Chicago : University of Chicago Press,, 1976.

Muhammadiyah and NU. The key words such as “radical” and “fundamentalist” can hardly be associated with Muhammadiyah as *an organization*. It is within the question of whether associating Indonesian Muslims with Muhammadiyah only by membership or by what their functional leaders or by all the followers of Muhammadiyah who hold the same religious worldview lie the academic problems. While talking about those who are the functional leaders or officers of Muhammadiyah is structural approach, talking about those who follow and practice the Muhammadiyah-interpreted Islam or its religious worldview is a cultural approach. One can only conclude that connections do exist.

Muhammadiyah is almost 100 years old. By that age, Muhammadiyah has established and well-managed around 5000 educational institutions ranging from universities to elementary schools and kindergartens. Muhammadiyah also manages more than 300 hospitals and health clinics, around 250 orphanages, more than 1000 financial institutions including cooperative businesses, banks and insurance providers. In addition, in order to provide rooms for religious activities, Muhammadiyah usually (always?) builds a prayer house in every institution it controls. This means that there are around 6500 prayer

houses attached to the above institutions. This is in addition to prayer houses which are built particularly for prayers and other regular religious activities away from those institutions which are more than twice as big as the number of the institutions it controls. These institutions of Muhammadiyah have produced more than twenty millions of Muslims who follow the same interpretation of Islam or they are only 'shaped' by the views of the Muhammadiyah leaders. They spread in almost every region where there are Muslims down to sub-districts (*kecamatan*).

What these figures can tell us is that Muhammadiyah has created multi layers of social capital that can be used not only for religious but also political purposes. It is by using this capital that Muhammadiyah is able to play important role in Indonesian socio-politics.¹⁴ It is not an exaggeration to assert that if a condition can be made in which Indonesian structure of government collapsed and have to be replaced, the only structure of an organization that is ready to face such a challenge is Muhammadiyah.

14 For this account see for example Alfian. *Muhammadiyah : The Political Behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism*. Yogyakarta : Gajah Mada University Press, 1989, Syaifullah. *Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah Dalam Masyumi*. Jakarta : Grafiti, 1997 and Syamsuddin, M. Sirajuddin. "Religion and Politic in Islam : The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia's New Order." PhD, University of California, 1991.

To further illustrate, it is worthwhile to quote a common “philosophy” within Muhammadiyah circle which came up often during my interviews with Muhammadiyah leaders. Their view is that “Muhammadiyah is not anywhere but it is everywhere.” Abdul Mu’thi, a young national leader of Muhammadiyah gave an example that Muhammadiyah cadre exist in most political parties; PPP, Golkar, PDIP, PBB, PK or PKS, and even PKB though the majority of them is in PAN. Every one of them can virtually meet when the issues are being talked and approach being used is their common worldview, such as “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” Abdul Mu’thi made a convincing example that is the successful of Amein Rais in forcing down Soeharto from his power in May 1998 with his anti KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) and Abdurrahman Wahid in 2002 with his Bulog Gate affairs, have only been successful because of this power of worldview of Muhammadiyah. None could imagine, Abdul Mu'thi argued, that with only 7% of PAN seats in the House of Parliament (DPR) could gain strong power to do such big political move. The best explanation for this is networks of cadres and followers of Muhammadiyah that exist *everywhere* (see figure III below).

Religious Worldview and Multi-layers of Networks

To examine the role of Muhammadiyah in socio-political context, one can not merely rely on the structural body of this organization, a fatal failure that most previous Indonesianists and students have done. But the most important aspect that one has to take seriously into account is the religious worldview of this organization. Because it is on this worldview that political networks of Muhammadiyah is constructed from which its political force is expanded and constantly generated. The glue that binds Muhammadiyah with its followers and constructs the bridges among other Islamic networks (Putnam 2000)¹⁵ can be seen in its "religious-worldview" in the following explanations. All the institutions mentioned earlier play important roles in indoctrinating Muhammadiyah understanding and the teachings of Islam which the above historical explanations of origins. In addition to the institutions of education mentioned earlier, in every institution of Muhammadiyah is built a prayer house for daily prayers where three important religious activities which are usually organized; daily and *Jum'ah* prayers, *dakwah* and collecting donation or charity (*infaq* or *sadaqah*) for internal purposes. This means that those activities are well organized in more than six thousands prayer houses.¹⁶ The *dakwah*

15 For bonding and bridging framework on social capital see Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

16 During my field work in Jambi, a province of Southern Sumatera, I was told by a leader of a West Sumatran origin of Muhammadiyah that recently in many places of religious activities they no longer use the name and symbol of Muhammadiyah. Because all they need is the religious understanding and messages

activities are usually performed after each prayer. The Islamic rituals that are practiced by Muhammadiyah are introduced through direct experience and the reasons for performing such rituals are inserted along with the *dakwah*. Since these activities are internal in their nature, only those who have opportunity or privileges to attend their activities will know what and how the followers of Muhammadiyah are indoctrinated.¹⁷

In addition, the curriculum in Muhammadiyah schools and universities devotes less than 40% percent of class hours to religious subjects. However, unlike in many other Islamic schools or *pesantren* in Indonesia, in Muhammadiyah schools “*muhammadiyah-isation*” (the process of making one to be Muhammadiyah followers) is well programmed. This is accomplished with a number of subjects called *kemuhammadiyah* (Muhammadiyahness). From a number of interviews, I gained the strong impression that followers are not trained to be aware of their Muhammadiyahness more than their Muslimhood. They are trained to be ideal Muslims as personified in the doctrine of “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” Therefore,

that are delivered and practiced is their. “We are aware of this all,” he said. Personal interview with the author, 24 June 1006.

17 The author is pretty sure that until recently only Indonesian flexible-traditionalist Muslims will join Muhammadiyah-explicit activities let alone those who are not Muslims. In other words these unwritten activities have rarely been touched by Indonesianists. However, in the last three or four years that have a number of Muhammadiyah young intellectuals who bravely and loudly spoken what Muhammadiyah is all about regarding their religious-world view.

regardless of what Muhammadiyah leaders are saying, their commitment to the pristine Islam remains firm.

In addition the knowledge and indoctrination of Islam gained from Muhammadiyah teachers is spread in every *dakwah* activity within their inner circle. For example, their preachers usually (if not always) introduce their sermon, *khutbah* and other related religious activities by quoting popular *hadiths* among Muhammadiyah circles or Salafi or Wahhabi in general. For example, "I warn you of the newly invented matters (in the religion), and every newly invented matter is *bid'ah* (innovation), and every *bid'ah* is misguidance, and every misguidance is in the Hellfire." Another hadith that usually follows is "Whoever sees a wrong, and is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can't, then with his tongue; if he can't, then with his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith." This is a clear way to identify that (most of the time if not always) the sermon giver is from Muhammadiyah which in many works on Indonesian Islamic studies is grouped into "modernist Islam". They are bound by religious worldview by means of particular verses of the Qur'an or Hadiths of the Prophet. The strongest glue is produced from a number of verses regarding "commending right and forbidding wrong" which is found in seven verses of the Qur'an with different phrases but the same "key words" (Q3:104, Q3:110, Q3:114, Q7:157, Q9:112, Q22:41, and Q31:17).

Samples of verses of the Qur'an and Hadiths mentioned here seems to be the most frequent referred to by Muhammadiyah followers and are also the same as what are usually referred to in most circles of radical Islam. In fact, the 104th verse of Ali Imran is the famous motto of Muhammadiyah. It reads "Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity." *Mufassir*, interpreters of the Qur'an differ on *why, who to whom and about what* "commanding right and forbidding" in the related verses is applied.¹⁸

A recent study on democracy in Indonesia (Mujani 2003) reveals that 48% of devoted Indonesian Muslims (*santri*) closely associate themselves with NU and 18% with Muhammadiyah in the context of their religious worldview. The most recent estimation of the number of people who associate themselves with Muhammadiyah, referred to as *keluarga besar Muhammadiyah* is around 25 to 30 million. But registered membership of Muhammadiyah is less than one million. I haven't been able to find any reliable figures for Muhammadiyah followers. I propose to call them "followers" of Muhammadiyah as they follow a particular method of Islamic practice or come from the

18 Michael Cook has provided us a thorough study on how verses of the Qur'an containing "commanding right and forbidding wrong" has been interpreted and implemented by Islamic schools of thought in jurisprudence and theology. See *Commending Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought*, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, 2000.

particular family, who has been involved in the organization for a long period of time, but they are not necessarily *registered* or are members of Muhammadiyah. Referring to them as *members* of Muhammadiyah can be misleading.

Figure I: Approximation of Muhammadiyah Followers¹⁹


Indonesian Total Population	201,241,999
Muslims	177,528,772
Age 10-70+	158,929,471
Santri	131,911,460
NU 48% of <i>santri</i> Muslims	63,317,501
Muhammadiyah 18% of <i>santri</i> Muslims	23,744,063

There is a very important difference between the *followers* and *members* because only the latter have privileges such as access to leadership positions within the structural bodies of Muhammadiyah. Only those who own a membership card have the privileges to be appointed to be the leader or chair of Muhammadiyah's institutions. However, the *followers* of Muhammadiyah play important role in

19 The percentage I am referring here is adopted from Saiful Mujani "Religious Democrats : Democratic Culture and Muslim Political Participation in Post-Suharto Indonesia." PhD, Ohio State University, 2003, pp. 109-110 and the number of Indonesian population is adopted from Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's population : ethnicity and religion in a changing political landscape*, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, c2003.

implementing Muhammadiyah's policies and decisions both in political and religious matters. Muhammadiyah's policies, decisions and *fatwas* (religious edicts) concerning religious matters play a significant role in building a spirit of attachment between Indonesian Muslims who practice a set of Islamic rituals on the one hand and Muhammadiyah as an organization on the other; essentially between cultural and structural Muhammadiyah.

Figure II: Configuration of Indonesian Muslims' Affiliation with Muhammadiyah



As far as "membership" is concerned, there are a number of issues that have to be addressed in order to get a comprehensive picture of Muhammadiyah membership. This is also applicable to other Islamic organizations in Indonesia. One is *how* and *who* Muhammadiyah perceives as "members" and what Muhammadiyah calls and how it treats those who are not members but are affiliated to or follow the Islamic "version" of this organization. The other issue concerns *what*

and *who* are considered "members" in Western context of social organizations and whether this understanding of "membership" also has the exact meaning in Muhammadiyah and other religious organizations in Indonesia

While most Indonesianists have singled out as "members" for those who are associated with Muhammadiyah,²⁰ to the best of my knowledge, there are at least five terms that are commonly heard among Muhammadiyah community or other religious organizations that are associated with what most Indonesianist named as "members;" they are *warga*, *keluarga* or *keluarga Besar* (family or big family) or I refer here as *followers*, *anggota* (members), *kader*, *tokoh*, and *pimpinan*.

Muhammadiyah refers *warga*, *keluarga* or *keluarga besar*, or what I refer to as *followers* in this paper, to those who in one way or another have been trained, indoctrinated or taught with Muhammadiyah religious worldview through the aforementioned institutions. Very few of them chose to register themselves as members but the large majority of them (95%) are not registered (see figure II). As mentioned elsewhere, they are taught or indoctrinated to practice the

20 See for example Andrew MacIntyre. "The Indonesian debacle: what Americans need to know and do", *The National Interest* n53 (Fall 1998 n53): pp41(12), Robin Bush, "Democracy and Development: Challenges for the Islamic World", presented at CSID Sixth Annual Conference, Washington, DC - April 22 - 23, 2005, available at www.islam-democracy.org accessed on 5 August 2006.


"pristine" Islam, to be chosen as those who have responsibility to conduct "commanding right and forbidding wrong", to be well aware of and stay away from what they call as "TBC" (*tachayul, bid'a* and *churafat*), and most of all the "correct" Islam that will enter paradise is their group of Islam, Muhammadiyah. Muhammadiyah and its followers are supposed to be the 73rd of Muslim group which deserves to go to *Jannah* (heaven) while the rest are the misled and will go to the hell. As those who hold the responsibility to commanding right and forbidding wrong of whoever they are, they believe that they should call other Muslims to join their "pristine" Islam. This is not for them, they would argue, but to save the others. Any social and religious problems they face in their community and environment from the smallest scale to the largest one will be automatically be looked from and examined by this worldview.²¹

After they are taught or indoctrinated with such religious worldview they continue their life in various sectors or professionals such as government employees, teachers, doctors, researchers, businessmen, religious preachers, and activists or leaders of other Islamic

21 Since the last few years, there has been some process of "metamorphosis" within Muhammadiyah. One section (JIMM, The networks of Young Intellectual of Muhammadiyah) of this metamorphosis has softened their views from such radical worldview. But JIMM has been marginalized since the victory of Din Syamsuddin, the present National Chairman of Muhammadiyah. Suaidi Asyari, "Muhammadiyah and Radical Islam: Identity "Metamorphosis" and a Real Threat from Within," presented at International Postgraduate Seminar, Center for Contemporary Islamic Studies Faculty of Law, The University of Melbourne, Australia, 22 October 2005.

organizations. Within these circles of professionals followers may identify themselves as Muhammadiyah or may not, but one thing is certain that their religious worldview, culture, and commitment to the “pristine” Islam with the aforementioned responsibility are firmly held onto.

Figure III: Structure of Muhammadiyah Religious-based Social Capital



(*Arrows from the triangles to the circle are interpreted that Muhammadiyah followers are taught to struggle for God's mercy and therefore they show their loyalty to Muhammadiyah by becoming God's volunteers in making sure that pristine Islam is promoted, practiced and protected. **A-D and others represent various professions persevered by Muhammadiyah followers, there are many)

Muslims who have been indoctrinated with Muhammadiyah-religious worldview in Muhammadiyah-organized religious institutions continue their life with the *embedded* worldview in any sectors fit to their own profession or field (as the triangle figures indicate in figure III). Be they as Government employees, university staff, politicians in political parties, activists of NGOs, activists of *other Islamic organizations*, *religious missionaries (da'i)* and others. Here, one has to be reminded again that while their businesses life are different from one to another, their religious activities, such as attending *pengajian* (religious gathering) and the five daily prayers, giving charity both regular and

irregular, and having similar view toward the other or non-Muslims, they keep attending similar religious activities. Most of them do not have Muhammadiyah ID and they are not under the "control" of Muhammadiyah structures. They are culturally under the influence of Muhammadiyah - but not structurally. In other words, in terms of structure of the organization, they are not members of Muhammadiyah. They can organize "collective actions" namely when they are virtually met in the intersection of "commanding right and forbidding wrong." It is here that one can see "cohesive power of weak ties" (Granovetter, 1973).

By 'weak ties' here means that none can blame Muhammadiyah on what its followers are doing in whatever matter it is even though every one can see and tell that the associations between the two are clear. Both those who have been indoctrinated with Muhammadiyah religious worldview and Muhammadiyah as structured organization provide mutual benefits, but Muhammadiyah leaders tend to cover the connections for various reasons. This is precisely what happens to the problem of *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA as will be clearer soon.

It is reported that more than 87% of activists of leaders of Muhammadiyah,²² have a habit of reading daily newspapers. By taking

²²Pimpinan Pusat Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, *Tanfidz Keputusan Mukhtamar Ke 9 Nasyiatul Aisyiyah*. Yogyakarta, 2001. This survey by the Central Leadership of

into consideration accessibility to media which varies from region to region in Indonesia, this result of survey is very much applicable to most Muhammadiyah followers. When these expanded Muhammadiyah affiliations encounter daily social problems, the first thing they would do is to consult the reference directly from the Qur'an and Hadiths of the Prophet into which the problems can be grouped. The verses of the Qur'an and Hadiths of the Prophet mentioned earlier can automatically pop-up to them. It is here that the principles of Muhammadiyah-religious worldview work well. This is regardless of their maturity or advance knowledge of doing such direct consultation with the Qur'an. Thus it is very likely that many of them merely use translation of the Qur'an and Hadiths.

The term *anggota* (members) is used for those who have held a Muhammadiyah ID called KTAM (*Kartu Tanda Anggota Muhammadiyah*). Until 2000 there were 900,400 who were registered. Around 60% of these are aged between 20-40. More than 50% finished their higher education or undergraduate. More than 46% work in non-governmental sectors, such as private businesses and teachers in private schools. In terms of gender, around 40% of them were

Nasyiatul Aisyiyah refers to activists and leaders of Nasyiatul Aisyiyah. It is very likely that this kind survey is more or less applicable to most sections of Muhammadiyah.

women.²³ In terms of structural organization, right and responsibility, only to this category *anggota* or members can be applied and not otherwise. For example, only those who have KTAM can run for Muhammadiyah leadership.

When Muhammadiyah leaders discuss or talk about political issues, such as political competition, the most frequently referred vocabulary is *cadre* (*kader*). Talking about *cadre* is very much related to those who have been active in various autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah, such as IMM, Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youths), Nasyyatul Aisyiyah (Women Youths of Muhammadiyah), Hizbul Wathan and Remaja Muhammadiyah. However, the term 'cadre' is also applied to those who have been *Muhammadiyah-ized* through its religious worldview, have been active in organizing Muhammadiyah religious activities and explicitly promote that worldview although they have not joined these autonomous bodies of Muhammadiyah. Thus, in its political sense a *cadre* does not necessarily mean one who has been formally trained and had an ID.

Tokoh (figure) or *pimpinan* (leaders or managers) mostly referred to those who are running or used to run Muhammadiyah offices in whatever level they are. Their statements represent the official

²³ For other details see Muhammad Sayuti and others (eds.), *Profil Anggota Muhammadiyah*, LP3 Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, 2000.

statement of Muhammadiyah and no one else who are from outside of this circle can make a statement on Muhammadiyah's stance dealing with either religious or political issues. This is in contrast to the culture of NU; senior *kiai* (religious clerics) outside the circle of NU board can still issue *fatwa* (religious edicts) "on behalf of NU" though the implementation of which are only limited to their own clients. Most of national executives called *Pimpinan Pusat*, hold PhD (S3), many have even honoured professors in different fields, only few hold Masters (S2) and very least graduates.

Talking about Muhammadiyah in the current of Indonesian socio-politics means that one is talking about the religious-worldview of a quarter of Indonesian-*santri* Muslims regarding their role in every aspect of Indonesians' life. This is to suggest that we are talking about the followers of Muhammadiyah's worldview in politics in general and political competition, education, economy, and the future direction of Indonesian Islam. One can not only look at what Muhammadiyah leaders are doing at national level in Jakarta but he or she also has to look at activities those who hold the same religious-worldview. A vertical-structural approach or more specifically what their ruling leaders' says will not help us comprehend their political agenda in Indonesian nation-wide.

When analyzing Muhammadiyah in political sphere by keeping in mind the 25 million followers, we must talk about PAN, PBB, PKS (Prosperous Justice Party, formerly PK), and larger portion of PPP, Golkar, and even PDIP. As has been acknowledged that though not representing Muhammadiyah, its politicians exist in these political parties. This is particularly true in the case of *shari'aisation* of PERDA. PAN (National Mandate Party) was established in 1998 by Amien Rais who was the National Chairman of Muhammadiyah by the time of the establishment but later was replaced by Syafi'i Ma'arif. In all regions across Indonesia, PAN local formation was initiated by mostly if not all modernist or Muhammadiyah leaders or activists.

PKS (Crescent Star Party) was established by student Muslim activists of secular universities but only gained around 2 % in the 1999. The party could boost its vote up to 7% in the 2004 General Election. A decrease of vote happened to PAN, Golkar and PPP (see who were the supporters of these parties below). During campaign period of 2004 General Election politicians of Muhammadiyah in PKS very often deployed Muhammadiyah Islamic ideology or worldview of "commending right and forbidding wrong" as its main reference.

PBB is an Islamic political party which was established prior to the 1999 General Election by Yusril Ihza Mahendra (now serving as Secretary of Bambang Susilo Yudoyono's Cabinet). The founders of PBB openly acknowledged that the party is a continuation of Masyumi, a political party which was banned by Soekarno in 1959 and continued to be banned by New Order Government due to its alleged association to DII/TII (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia* or Islamic State/Indonesian Islamic Army Movement).²⁴ Since Masyumi was founded, Muhammadiyah and NU were of its propitious ground from which the former gained its major support. Masyumi national leadership was actually dominated by Muhammadiyah leaders.²⁵ However, due to conflicts between NU and modernist camp which was mainly from Muhammadiyah, in 1952 the former withdrew from this alliance. In the late 1959 Masyumi was involved in a regional rebellion in West Sumatera with the main issue of the implementation of Islamic *shari'a*. Masyumi henceforth was bound to be banned by the government. Since then, organizationally, Muhammadiyah kept concentrating on running the aforementioned institutions, but its individuals joined the political party on individual basis. In one occasion, Mahendra stated "we will continue to struggle so that the

²⁴ See Barbara Sillars Harvey, *Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965*, Ann Arbor, Mich : University Microfilms International, 1989.

²⁵ Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, "Politics, Islam and Public Opinion", in *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15 Number 1, 2004, p. 111.

Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) which was the product of nationalist-Muslim can be inserted to the 1945 Constitution both now and in the future. But we will struggle for it through democratic, legal and *constitutional* ways."²⁶

PPP was formed in 1971 following the political restriction of New Order Government in which only three political parties were allowed to exist; Golkar, PPP, and PDI. Golkar was initially political vehicle of the ruling government which consisted of both Muslims and non-Muslims. PDI consisted mainly of non-Muslims and *abangan* or nominal Muslims. PPP was made of NU, Parmusi and SI. NU represented traditionalist Islam while Parmusi and SI represented modernist Islam. Similar conflicts in late 1940s and early 1950s between traditionalist and modernist camps reemerged and NU officially declared its withdrawal from PPP and returned to social and religious organization known as *kembali ke khittah 1926* in early 1980s. The modernists remained with the PPP.

In late 1980s and early 1990s Golkar was Islamic-ised (*dihijau royoyakan*) by modernist Muslims by means of HMI connections during which ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) was

²⁶ "Perjuangkan Piagam Jakarta" (Struggle for Jakarta Charter), available at <http://www.tokohindonesia.com>, accessed on 8 August 2006. The stress on *constitutional* is to remind us that Masyumi had done this before through in constitutional ways, such as rebellions.

formed. Most of ICMI activists were from modernist background. Golkar and PPP were then dominated by modernist Muslims.

As a political party one can argue that PAN does not support the movements such as the *shari'aisation* of PERDA. However from what various religious statements of many leaders of Muhammadiyah I interviewed and by taking Muhammadiyah religious-world view, no one can deny that individual PAN politicians in the DPR and DPRD play a role. This is also applicable for politicians with Muhammadiyah-background in other political parties, such as Golkar and PPP. Within Muhammadiyah elites it is commonly heard that *Muhammadiyah tidak dimana-mana tapi ada dimana-mana* (Muhammadiyah is not anywhere but it is everywhere).

Among NGOs that have Islamic base, those who support the *shari'aisation* of PERDA include DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiah Indonesia) or Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in almost every province and most regency, Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front), KPPSI in South Sulawesi, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah and now KPSI in West Sumatra which was declared on 28 July, 2006. However, one has to be reminded that none of these NGOs are represented in the House of Parliaments. Although there are connections between those who are

outside the House of Parliaments, the real role players are inside the House of Parliaments.

Shari'a-isation of PERDA

PERDA stands for *Peraturan Daerah* or Regional Codes or regulations. In the structure of Indonesian government, regions under national level are called *daerah* which consists of provinces and regencies. Following the introduction of Regional Autonomy, Law Number 22 1999, all across Indonesia, regional government both at provincial and regency (district?) level have the privileges to regulate their own local businesses with the exception of religious matters which are still centralized. It is in tandem with this political reform that *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA gains its momentum. By *shari'h-isation* of PERDA the present paper refers to the process of making Regional Codes or regulations under the principles and spirits of particular interpretation of Islamic Law.²⁷

Empirically, after the collapse of the New Order government Indonesians, regardless of their religious backgrounds, in many regions in Indonesia have faced more social problems in addition to

²⁷ Following the introduction of Regional Autonomy all across Indonesia, the hierarchy of law in Indonesia has changed, for example after President-Presidential Decree used to be followed by Kepmen (Keputusan Menteri – Ministerial Decree-ed) but now Perda will follow Keppres. This means that regional government now has the privileges to regulate their own local businesses.

what they used to face during New Order government, such as various types of crimes, corruption, illegal gambling, sexual abuse toward women and children, child pornography, women trafficking, drugs which have reached villages and children down to primary schools, and others. In the minds of devout Muslims such social problems are called *munkarat* or wrongdoings. Despite the fact such social problems are not exclusively caused by or have impact upon Muslims alone, it appears that Muslims feel that those are their problems. On the other hand, voices of non-Muslims concerning the problems can hardly be heard.

Such social problems are actually multi-layered, but there are three main layers. One is the failure of educational and religious institutions to educate people with sufficient knowledge to save them from wrong doings. Another is the failure of related institutions to main security for people in particular regions. Still another reason is poverty and other economic-gap caused problems.

In the eyes of those who were interviewed, the main cause of the problems lies at the failure of existing system of constitution with the police institutions as its backbone. This failure of related institutions has resulted in pessimistic attitudes among members of society. AL, for instance, a leader of Muhammadiyah of South Sulawesi, singled out

the Indonesia's secular institutions as the root cause of all social problems.²⁸ Muslim leaders, like AL, argue that the problem is not only with the policemen, but with the Dutch inherited secular constitution. He argued that even those who have committed crimes have been sent to jail after they are released they would do the same things over and over again. In many cases it was even found that there were collusions between criminals and police officers.

It is based on the above logic and social condition that the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA has gained momentum. In other words, *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA serves a solution offered by those who already have such religious worldview when they look at social problems from their own perspective. So, the question would be: why *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA becomes problem? The *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA becomes problem for three main reasons. There are many scholars who look at the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA from historical perspective. They believe that the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA is basically the legacy of the Jakarta Charter. They argue that after the failure of central-national approach, the supporters of the implementation of *Shari'a* are now working from the bottom with the long term aim of nationalizing it. But looking for the ongoing process of the *Shari'a-isation* it is very likely that it does not very much deal with politics. So there are three other arguments

28 Personal interview, March 2004.

that can be presented here. First is due to the terminologies or vocabularies used in the PERDA which are explicitly *Islamic* (or Arabicized?), such as *ma'siat* (sinful acts), *aurat* (private parts of the body which should not be exposed to public) and the word *shari'a* itself. Second is due to the certain contains or articles of particular PERDA that potentially violate individual rights and freedom. Third is due to fact that *there are* those who enjoy or get benefit from such social problems and the implementation of such PERDA will lost their benefits.

Apart from the above three reasons, it is quite clear that at particular stages throughout the process of drafting of particular PERDA, some distortions have been injected. The PERDA does not only concern with the problems have mentioned earlier (examples) but it goes beyond what the initial aims of proposing a PERDA. It ends with disturbing much privacy, plurality, and religious tolerance which are the very core of democratic values.

Although this paper does not focus on *what* Shari'a PERDA is all about which very much deals with law, constitutions, and legal aspect, but rather *how* and *why* it gains massive support from religious and social perspective, an overview about the essence of the problem is undeniably necessary. Therefore, a few examples of PERDA are

explained. Generally speaking, the most aspects contained in most *shari'a* PERDA deal with prostitution, alcoholic drink, dress code, *zakat* (Islamic-alms-giving), gambling, and drugs. In other words not all the aforementioned *real* social problems are well touched by these aspects. In its relation to woman issues, it is much worse because there is an inclination of blaming women as the sole source of social problems regarding sexual-related problems. On the contrary, men seem to enjoy their privilege as being untouched by the PERDA.

The Padang Municipality Law, West Sumatra No: 451.442/Binsos-III/2005 which includes among others that "every Muslim is obliged to wear *jilbab* and Islamic dress and non-Muslims are encouraged to follow suit". Also with the same contain is Perda No.05 2003 of Bulukumba Regency of South Sulawesi. In dealing with prostitutes many of the *Shari'a* PERDA has targeted women who dress or appear by coincidence in the same manner as prostitutes can be accused to be *prostitutes* and are targeted by those PERDA. As a result, there have been a number of cases in which non-Muslims are asked to wear *jilbab* such as in Bulukumba or those who have similar dress as the prostitutes are forced to be interrogated such as in West Sumatera and Tangerang, Banten.

The supporters

On 28 July – 3 August 2006, LSI (*Lingkaran Survey Indonesia* or Indonesian Circle of Survey) conducted a survey throughout the whole 33 three provinces of Indonesia regarding public opinion on the *shari'aisation* of PERDA. The results contradict what Islamic politicians have decided about the PERDA. The results are the following:²⁹ around 70% of Muslim respondents prefer neither to adopt Middle Eastern style of democracy nor to follow Western secular democracy, but want to maintain Pancasila (the five pillars).³⁰ Pancasila can accommodate monotheism, pluralism and secularism. While religious values can be substantially inserted, secular-modern values can also be adopted, but none will solely take control over the other. More than 61% of the participants do not favor the introduction of Islamic *shari'a* PERDA to deal with violations of social and religious norms. In dealing with personal religious devotion which exclusively deals with Muslims and for the benefits of other fellow Muslims, such as inheritance, pilgrimage, and religious charity or donation (*perwakafan*), most respondents favor such regulations; 58.5%, 75.5% and 59.5% respectively. However, when it relates to individuals regardless of their

²⁹ Available at <http://www.lsi.co.id/artikel.php?id=446> accessed on 25 August 2006.

³⁰ The Five Principles are (1) belief in One Supreme God; (2) humanitarianism; (3) nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; (4) consultative democracy; and (5) social justice for all Indonesian people.

religious background or private choices such as dress codes, amputation for theft, lashing for criminals who have committed adultery or are drunk, and death penalty for those who commit religious apostasy, the respondents show their disfavor as follows 77.3%, 77.3%, 56.4%, 63.3%, and 71.2% respectively. In addition, when it deals with sinful acts or wrongdoings (*maksiat* and *munkaraat*) such as drinking alcohol, (illegal) gambling and prostitution, 61% of the respondents agree to incorporate such regulations into KUHP (*Kitab Undang Hukum Pidana* or Indonesian Criminal Code) and not within *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA.

Most questions being asked for this survey were concerned with the detailed contents of most *Shari'a* PERDA. From the results it can be concluded that most Indonesian Muslims are actually not concerned with "the" *Shari'a* but with social problems inflicting them and with the fact that the available institutions are not able to handle such problems satisfactorily. It is the logic of this social psychology that is being employed by the *shari'a*-minded politicians within the House of Parliament.

Political parties which aim to implement an Islamic state or Islamic ideology received very little support in the 1999 and 2004 General Election. For example, in 2004 General Election, in the Regency of

Bulukumba of South Sulawesi, PKS gained only 3.7%, PBB only gained 1.1%, PPP gained 3.5% and PAN gained 3.8%, but Golkar received 22.10%. So much so we can conclude that the draft of *Shari'a* PERDA must have been supported by members of DPR on individual basis across political parties. Needless to say that non-Muslims or less devout Muslims will not support such radical movement. In addition, we are reminded again that radical Islamic movements, such as HTI, FPI and others are not represented in the House of Parliament and none of these movements have their own educational institutions in those regions. Even if there are new institutions of schools that affiliate to them, they must be new while the *Shari'a* worldview had existed long beforehand.

Although the supporters of the *shari'a-isation* of PERDA come from the different groups of Indonesian Muslims across political parties, a closer look would reveal that there is one strong bridge across them, namely religious world view of *amr ma'ruf nahy munkar* (commanding right and forbidding wrong). This goes back to what has been discussed earlier, that is religious-based Social capital. For those who have been indoctrinated within modernist Islamic institutions such as Muhammadiyah, to be a "chosen" member of Muslims is one of their goals in their life.

The politicians who support the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA are mostly students or alumni of "secular" universities as oppose to those IAINs (State Institute of Islamic Studies). A large majority of students of IAIN are from *pesantren* while a large majority of students of "secular" universities are from secular schools. In addition, the process of drafting the *Shari'a* PERDA takes place in the House of Regional Parliament (DPR or DPRD). There is no evidence whatsoever that radical Islamic organizations such as HTI, JI, FPI are represented in the House of Parliament. Even KPPSI of South Sulawesi is not represented in the provincial House of Parliament. So, it is quite easy to make a judgment that the supporters of *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA are politicians who are in political parties represented in the House of Parliament. If there are those who work or cooperate with those who are in the House of Parliament for the same goals outside the House of Parliament, then the aforementioned networks and worldview can convincingly explain the relationship between the two.

From media reports, we are repeatedly told that as an organization, Muhammadiyah does not support the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA, but no one can take for granted that its individual leaders or politicians would obey or follow such policy. In addition, there are too many individual leaders of it who can be "hijacked" by the official voice of the organization. H.M. Siradjuddin (the sectary of KPPSI of South

Sulawesi) asserts that in line with the demand for Regional Autonomy, particularly the implementation of Islamic *Shari'a* in South Sulawesi and with the Muslim Congress which one of the founding fathers was a leader of Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi, Muhammadiyah has the responsibility to struggle for it. He asserts that if there are Muslims who do not support the implementation of *shari'a*, ... they are actually *kufir* (infidels). "May the struggle of Muhammadiyah to implement and uphold Islam in high esteem can be achieved towards the truest Muslim community."³¹ AS, a figure of Muhammadiyah Jambi (Sumatra) states that the implementation of *shari'a* through PERDA is actually their ultimate goals in Islam, but for many political considerations,³² Muhammadiyah never explicitly mentions so.³³

In addition, among the ruling leaders of Muhammadiyah who persistently support the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA is Adian Husaini, the chairperson of DDII and now also a member of *Tabligh* (Missionary) Council and Special Mission of Central Board of Muhammadiyah for 2005-2010. Husaini is a son of Dachli Hasyim, a Member of Muhammadiyah Board Padangan Branch, Bojonegoro. He is a graduate of IPB (Bogor Institute of Agriculture) where he joined HTI. In 1997 he gained Cum laude Predicate when he was successfully defended his

³¹ *Fajar Daily*, available at www.fajar.co.id, accessed on 12 November 2005.

³² Refer back to the experience of Masyumi mentioned elsewhere.

³³ Personal interview 26 June 2006.

thesis "Pragmatisme Politik Luar Negeri Israel" (The Pragmatism of Foreign Politics of Israel"). He is also the General Secretary of KISDI (Indonesian Committee for Islamic World Solidarity). Husaini is also an active contributor of *Hidayatullah*, *Sabili* and other Islamist media.³⁴ Regarding the *Shari'a-isation* of PERDA he argues that there are ten reasons why every one should support such a movement. One of the reasons is the fact that "PERDAs that appeared in a number of regions is the result of fair democratic process. All components of the society, fractions (in DPRD) and bureaucrats are fully involved in the process of making them. Because those PERDAs are aspirations of components of the society, politicians, local bureaucrats who are gained from fair democratic process, the National Government do have the authority to annul them."³⁵

Conclusion

The discourses, movements and the successfulness of inserting the notions of *shari'a* into regional regulations in many regions in Indonesia is a product of procedural democracy in which the interests of radical Islam is deliberately mixed with the interests of puritan Islam. Those who are involved in making such decisions in the regional Houses of Parliaments have actually used their Islamic networks by using

³⁴ See <http://www.ukhuwah.or.id/>.

³⁵ www.swaramuslim.net, accessed on 24 July 2006.

democratic opportunity. If the media reports about the successfulness of such regulation in reducing social problems such as criminals and alcoholic-caused criminals as in Bulukumba is valid, then, the real problem might lie at the symbol rather than substance of the regulations. However, one cannot just simply accept such a view because there are articles of particular PERDA that are problematic, such as in the case of regulating individual choices of dressing and as such.

Though what has been presented in this paper is very much preliminary, suffice it to say that there are times when social capital has its own limitations especially if it is based on such particular considerations as religious values. Social problems are not unique to a particular group of people while other groups of people from different backgrounds also exist at the same time and place. Thus, what can be suggested here is that in order to function within civil society effectively and positively, every group of people need to look at social problems from their own religious perspective, but soon they start to talk about solutions to the problems, then cross boundaries-collective action has to be initiated. Both the majority and minority have to be engaged in every social problem they face. The issuance of *Shari'a* PERDA is a consequence of the absence of engagements of civil society across religious boundaries which have been well used by those who

already have networks with the same or similar worldview. What has to be further investigated is to what extent social capital of other minority religious believers are ready to coexist with other religious believers for the same causes of social problems and the readiness of the majority of religious believers to view social problems from a broader perspective.